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The political coordination of knowledge and  
innovation policies in Switzerland 
Thomas Griessen and Dietmar Braun 
The article highlights the main problems Switzerland faces in engaging in a more encompassing 
knowledge and innovation policy, an objective that is widely shared by the political elites. Two 
‘coordination gaps’ are highlighted in the context of Switzerland: the ‘federal divide’ that structures 
political governance in the knowledge space in manifold ways and the ‘utilitarian divide’ that is 
institutionalised within the federal administration. It is demonstrated that Swiss policy-makers have 
taken great pains to overcome the obstacles in the wake of the federal divide with some success, but 
have failed to do so with regard to the utilitarian divide. The lack of guiding and reflexive capacities at 
the cabinet level will make it difficult to overcome this divide in the future, though planned reforms at 
the agency level may help to build some bridges between at least basic and technological research. 
HOUGH IT IS CLEAR THAT Switzerland 
can be grouped with the successful countries 
with regard to knowledge production and tech-
nological innovation (see CEST, 2003; European 
Commission, 2003; OECD, 2004), there is a growing 
concern among Swiss policy-makers and the business 
community that the country has begun to lose its 
competitive position and that other countries, above 
all Nordic and several Asian countries, are advancing 
their position at a faster pace (Message, 2008–2011). 
Switzerland, as a small and export-oriented country, 
strongly depends on the world market. As it lacks 
natural resources, investments in knowledge produc-
tion, diffusion, and application are, as generally 
agreed, essential (Message, 2000–2003, 2004–2007, 
2008–2011). This explains why education, research, 
and technological innovation have received particular 
attention from government, parliament, and the pub-
lic during the last 15 years or so, especially after a 
period of economic slackness and considerable 
budget cuts that also affected the knowledge do-
mains during the 1990s. 
However, in a recently conducted study on institu-
tional aspects of political coordination of knowledge 
and innovation policies in Switzerland (Braun et al, 
2007), we found general agreement among Swiss  
policy-makers that policies concerning the ‘knowl-
edge space’1 — research policy, innovation policy; 
higher education, and professional education — are 
confronted with a number of problems regarding 
cross-sectoral policy coordination. There are above all 
two coordination gaps that cause problems: the first is 
the strongly institutionalised separation between basic 
research and higher education on the one hand and 
technological research and application and profes-
sional education on the other, i.e. the so-called utilitar-
ian divide. The second gap concerns the split of 
responsibilities and competences between the federal 
government and the cantons, i.e. the federal divide. 
The central question that will guide this article is 
therefore, what are the chances and conditions that 
Switzerland can bridge the ‘utilitarian divide’ and 
the ‘federal divide’? The answer will be sought by 
analysing whether it would be possible to adapt the 
organisation of political governance and introduce 
an encompassing innovation policy. Our analytical 
framework to assess coordination is based on the 
heuristics presented in the introduction to this  
special issue of Science and Public Policy. 
To better understand political coordination ca-
pacities in knowledge and innovation policy, we  
believe that it is important to present Switzerland’s 
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existing governance model related to the knowledge 
space in the next section, before assessing the coor-
dination capacities in terms of the concept presented 
in the introduction to this special issue of Science 
and Public Policy: at the cabinet level, including 
coordination capacities between the federal govern-
ment and member states; at the ministerial level (ex-
ternal and internal coordination); at the agency level, 
and vertically, across the multi-layered structure. In 
the final section we analyse ongoing reform attempts 
and their potential for improving political coordina-
tion capacities in Switzerland. 
Political governance structures in  
Switzerland’s knowledge and  
innovation policy 
The fundamental feature that profoundly shaped and 
still influences policy-making in the Swiss knowl-
edge space is federalism. We should underline that 
federalism structures policy-making at the govern-
mental level by the sharing of powers between the 
federal government and the cantons. 
Since the foundation of the federal state in 1848, 
the cantons have been responsible for education. 
Exceptions were first made when the federal  
government established the Federal Institute of 
Technology in Zurich (Eidgenössische Technische 
Hochschule Zürich, ETHZ) in order to promote  
tertiary education in the fields of engineering and 
sciences. Today the entire domain of ‘federal uni-
versities’, the ETH-domain, includes two universi-
ties, ETHZ and the Federal Technology Institute  
of Lausanne (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de 
Lausanne, EPFL) as well as four attached institutes 
conducting environmental, nuclear, and material  
research. The ETH-domain is governed by the  
ETH-Council, a kind of ‘self-governing body’ com-
posed of the directors of the ETHZ, the EPFL, and 
two other people from the ETH-domain as well as 
representatives of industry and politics. The council 
is chaired by a full-time president. 
In the case of vocational training the federal level 
became involved early at the beginning of the 20th 
century. With the introduction of the Federal Act on 
Professional Education after the economic crisis in 
the 1930s, the federal government took a leading 
role in the field of vocational education and has ex-
panded its domain competence ever after. Pro-
fessional education, however, is still characterised 
by a close collaboration between the cantons (re-
sponsible for professional schools), professional as-
sociations (defining curricula), and industry as well 
as other politically important associations such as 
trade unions. Many cantons established schools for 
higher studies in vocational education in different 
fields. Based on a federal act of 1995, the vast ma-
jority of these schools were transformed into Uni-
versities of Applied Sciences (Fachhochschulen, 
UAS), or simply polytechnics. The federal govern-
ment and the cantons share the funding of the poly-
technics; the cantons cover the major part (about 
70%). 
Research and technology funding were for a long 
time attributed neither to the federal nor to the can-
tonal level. The federal government became active in 
these domains after World War II but delegated the 
task of (basic) research funding to the Swiss  
National Science Foundation (Schweizerischer  
Nationalfonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen 
Forschung, SNSF). Today the SNSF promotes ap-
plied research as well, but basic research funding 
remains its main preoccupation (more than 80% of 
its budget) (see also Lepori, 2006). For the funding 
of technology development, the Committee for Sci-
entific Research (Kommission für wissenschaftliche 
Forschung, CSR) was established even earlier than 
the SNSF. The CSR has always been more closely 
attached to public administration and has served 
since the mid-1990s, after being renamed the Com-
mittee of Technology and Innovation (Kommission 
für Technologie und Innovation, CTI), the principal 
technology and innovation agency, typically foster-
ing research and development in joint university–
industry projects. 
At the end of the 1960s, when student numbers 
increased considerably and cantons started to put 
pressure on the federal government to participate in 
the financing of the cantonal universities, the federal 
level could not stay absent from higher education 
policy any longer. Because universities remain the 
principal places where publicly funded research is 
conducted in Switzerland (extra-university research 
institutes are few in numbers), the involvement in 
university governance also opened the possibility for 
the federal government of developing more ambi-
tions in research policy in general. A first step was 
the attribution of competences concerning research 
Thomas Griessen is a scientific staff member of the division 
‘Targeted Research’ at the Office of the Swiss National 
Science Foundation (SNSF) in Berne and a PhD student at 
the Department of Political Science, University of Lausanne. 
Since 1999 he has worked in the federal science administra-
tion and the SNSF. Beside that he studied the Swiss higher 
education and research system in several evaluation and 
research projects. Recently he has coordinated and co-
authored a study on a ministerial reorganisation combining 
education, research and innovation in one Swiss ministry, 
conducted at the Observatoire Science, Politique, Société, 
University of Lausanne. 
Dietmar Braun has been Professor of Political Science at 
the Institut d’Etudes Politiques et Internationales of the Uni-
versity of Lausanne since 1996. He has also been research 
councillor at the Swiss National Science Foundation since 
2004, and was editor of the Swiss Political Science Review 
between 2001 and 2004. He is an active member of the 
European Network of Excellence PRIME. He has worked on 
topics linked to science and technology issues since the 
beginning of the 1990s, especially on research funding poli-
cies and funding agencies. He was editor of a special issue 
of Science and Public Policy on principal-agent theory and 
research policy in 2003. 
Political coordination of knowledge and innovation policies 
Science and Public Policy May 2008  279
in the constitution to the federal government in 1973 
and the adoption of a Research Act in 1983. The 
increasing involvement of the federal government 
culminated in a new constitutional article in 2006 
that clearly acknowledged the joint responsibilities 
of the federal government and the cantons in 
(higher) education matters. The constitutional 
amendment strengthens the leading role of the fed-
eral government in education policy, but binds it at 
the same time to the interests of the cantons.2 
Hence, the federal government is clearly the main 
actor in vocational education and innovation as well 
as in research policy, though the prominent role of 
the cantons in professional schools, polytechnics, 
and universities constrains federal decisions in these 
areas in various ways. 
The governance structure in the knowledge space 
is summarised in Figure 1. 
Collaboration between the federal government 
and cantons was established between 1964 and 
1968, resulting in the Federal University Promotion 
Act, which allowed the federal government to assist 
cantonal universities with financial contributions. 
The Swiss University Conference (SUC), compris-
ing federal and cantonal representatives, has served 
ever since as a platform for coordination activities 
between the federal and cantonal levels. Up to the 
end of the 1990s it also included actors from policy 
fields such as the SNSF, the ETH-Council and sci-
ence academies, as well as representatives from in-
dustry and trade unions. Early studies described the 
governance mode at this time as corporatist steering 
with a ‘spontaneous concertation’ in the relationship 
between state actors and stakeholders (OCDE, 1971: 
16). In this initial setting of federal coordination, no 
systemic approach for a coherent science polity and 
policy was institutionalised in Switzerland; the 
rather incremental approach was then widely ac-
knowledged (OCDE, 1971: 16). 
In 1998, a revision of the University Promotion 
Act was undertaken. Inspired by new public man-
agement concepts, a stratification in the political 
organisation of higher education was introduced. 
The SUC became the main intergovernmental  
strategic political body, in which only government 
officials meet (today the State Secretary for Education 
and Research and the members of the cantonal gov-
ernments responsible for higher education) in order to 
steer the development of higher education institu-
tions. The revised institution was intended to over-
come the ‘old’ complicated and inefficient corporatist 
structure. The delegation of competences from the 
 
The delegation of competences from 
the federal and cantonal level to a 
common governing body for one 
policy field was an unprecedented 
endeavour in constitutional 
engineering at that time 
Figure 1. Political governance structure in Switzerland’s knowledge space
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federal and cantonal level to a common governing 
body for one policy field was an unprecedented en-
deavour in constitutional engineering at that time — 
in fact, it meant the official acknowledgment of a joint 
task as it had existed in Germany until recently in the 
field of higher education (see Edler and Kuhlmann 
in this special issue of Science and Public Policy). 
Finally, we have to mention the Swiss Science 
Council (SSC) that has, especially in the early stage 
of Switzerland’s science policy, marked its devel-
opment in close interaction with the Swiss Univer-
sity Conference and the federal government (OCDE, 
1971). We will discuss the development of the SSC, 
today called the Swiss Science and Technology 
Council (SSTC), in more detail in the section con-
cerning the role of strategic intelligence. 
Regarding the institutionalisation of knowledge 
and innovation policy within the federal administra-
tion, we have to emphasise that vocational education 
has always been separated from general (higher) 
education, and the (basic) research domains have 
been permanently administered apart from technol-
ogy and innovation policy in different ministries, 
called federal departments in Switzerland. 
In the mid-1990s, the topic of an organisational 
reform of departments was on the agenda of the  
federal government. The situation at that time was 
even more fragmented than it is today. There were 
more departments with interests and competence in 
research and innovation, and no encompassing pol-
icy existed to integrate the different interests into 
one coherent strategy — an explicit desire of the 
parliament (cf. Message, 2000–2003). The options 
discussed at this point in time were: 
1. To opt for an integration of all policy sectors  
into the confines of the Federal Department of 
Economic Affairs (FDEA) and to accentuate an 
economic orientation in education, research, and 
technology policy. 
2. To concentrate most policy fields into the Federal 
Department of Home Affairs (FDHA), with the 
exception of technology policy. 
3. To concentrate the ‘utilitarian’ knowledge fields 
into the FDEA and the ‘non-utilitarian’ ones into 
the FDHA. 
The last option was chosen and thereby a ‘linear’ 
thinking in innovation policies was strengthened 
(Braun et al, 2007).3 The major difference with  
the status quo ante was first, that there were now 
only two ministries responsible for matters of 
knowledge and innovation; and second, that the ex-
isting distinction between science-oriented and 
economy-oriented education and research policies 
was even more strongly institutionalised within the 
federal administration. 
Since 1996, the FDEA administers professional 
education (including the polytechnics) and the pro-
motion of technology, now called innovation. The 
respective policies are prepared in the Federal Office 
for Professional Education and Technology4 (Bunde-
samt für Berufsbildung und Technologie, OPET). 
The FDHA is responsible for the funding of basic 
and applied research as well as for the financial 
support of higher education institutions. Since 2005, 
the State Secretariat for Education and Research 
(Staatssekretariat für Bildung und Forschung, SER) 
is responsible for both policy fields. The unit that 
preceded the SER, the Group for Science and Re-
search (Gruppe für Wissenschaft und Forschung, 
GSR), was created at the beginning of the 1990s in 
order to better guide and coordinate higher education 
and research policy within the FDHA. The director 
of the GSR was appointed the status of state secre-
tary in 1992, presiding over a small secretariat. With 
this new top-level official for education and re-
search, federal interventions intensified in many  
respects (see below). 
If we add to this ‘dualism’ of the federal machin-
ery of government (‘utilitarian divide’) — both hori-
zontally and vertically — the fragmented structure at 
the level of knowledge activities between three dif-
ferent types of higher education institutions under 
various authority regimes as well as the shared com-
petencies for all matters of education between the 
federal government and cantons (‘federal divide’), 
we end up with a rather complex governance matrix 
in the Swiss knowledge space that seems difficult to 
reconcile and to coordinate. Figure 2 displays the 
institutional setting of Switzerland’s knowledge and 
innovation policy. 
Existing capacities of coordination 
Given the complex institutional matrix at the level of 
political governance, how can we assess the capaci-
ties of the political actors for mutual adjustment of 
their policies and coordinated action within and 
across policy fields? 
We will assess the coordination capacities in 
Switzerland by analysing existing coordination 
mechanisms horizontally at different institutional 
layers and vertically across them. 
Horizontal coordination at the cabinet level 
In Switzerland’s federal system, coordination of 
policies in knowledge and innovation faces two 
problematic features at the governmental or cabinet 
level: first, the structural disposition to achieve co-
ordination across policy fields; second, the relation-
ships between the federal and state levels. In this 
section we analyse structural limits of coordination 
as well as by what means coordination problems 
have been tackled at the level of the federal govern-
ment. In the next section we analyse collaboration 
between the federal and cantonal levels. 
What coordination needs regarding knowledge 
and innovation policy do we actually find at this 
level? 
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Since the Federal Research Act was enacted in 
1984, policy-planning procedures have become  
legally defined and thus compulsory for most actors. 
These planning and coordination mechanisms con-
cern both horizontal and vertical coordination and are 
meant to bring actors together in the preparation exer-
cise of the Message of the federal government, a  
governmental White Paper outlining policies for a 
four-year period (formerly restricted to research pol-
icy). The planning procedures in the Research Act put 
a clear emphasis on vertical collaboration. Regarding 
horizontal coordination, we have to mention two pro-
cedures designed to define objectives and priorities at 
the top level of federal political decision-making. 
First, until the early 1990s, it was the Science 
Council that proposed objectives regarding research 
policy for the quadrennial funding periods that pro-
vided the basis for the federal government to de-
velop general guidelines in research policy. 
Freiburghaus et al (1991: 39–41) are sceptical about 
the results of these planning and coordination 
mechanisms, because of their rather unspecific ob-
jectives, which are not appropriate for focusing the 
activities of the actors in the field. The Science 
Council itself appraised these coordination mecha-
nisms as much more effective than they might ap-
pear for external observers (SSC, 1989: 21). This 
early effort to establish policy objectives ceased to 
exist in the early 1990s. We will discuss the reasons 
for this development in a later section. 
Second, since 1968 the Federal Council has  
employed a more general instrument of coordina-
tion. This instrument is called legislation planning 
(Legislaturplanung). In this legislation plan, the 
government sets guidelines at the start of every four- 
year legislative period for all policy domains under  
federal responsibility. The document essentially lists 
large legislative projects, usually already well pre-
pared, for all federal departments, groups the issues 
in topical categories, and serves as an offer to the 
parliament to debate the matters in the up-coming 
legislative period. The significance of legislation 
planning is so far limited in the domain of knowl-
edge and innovation policy, as the so-called Mes-
sage itself is a more specific plan applicable to the 
same period. Still, the concomitant financial plan-
ning for the entire legislation has immediate effects 
on the knowledge and innovation domain. 
This demonstrates that strategic coordination or 
coordinated policy planning on the governmental 
level is not very well developed in Switzerland and 
faces several obstacles. Three structural features 
might explain why coordination on the cabinet level 
remains particularly difficult. 
First, Switzerland is an example of what the OECD 
has denominated an autonomy system at the level of 
government (OECD, 1987; see also the introduction 
to this special issue of Science and Public Policy): 
The federal government, i.e. the Federal Council, is 
an oversized cabinet, a four-party government. Every 
Federal Councillor is heading one of the seven de-
partments in the federal administration, which ex-
plains why party ideology can have a strong influence 
in the development of departmental policies. 
Second, there is no clear and binding coalition 
agreement that could help to overcome differences 
between party or departmental programmes. Al-
though propositions of the departments are discussed 
in the Federal Council, the intention of the responsi-
ble minister will usually find approval. The so-called 
co-signature during the preparation of governmental 
decisions remains the principal coordination  
Figure 2. Institutions in Switzerland’s knowledge and innovation policy at four levels 
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mechanism at this level: departmental propositions 
are subject to the criticism put forward by other de-
partments before a certain issue is discussed in the  
Federal Council. 
Third, both the composition of the Federal Coun-
cil and the attribution of departments to its members 
reflect a delicate equilibrium among a multitude of 
criteria (such as the share of power among the de-
partments and budgets, party politics, the balanced 
representation of linguistic groups, gender, as well 
as important cantons). Hence, organisational reforms 
of ministries after an election with the aim of  
re-arranging policy domains, quite normal in  
other countries, are very difficult to accomplish in 
Switzerland. 
Given all these restrictions, one understands that 
the federal government is seldom the place where 
encompassing policies — with regard neither to par-
ties nor to policy fields — are developed. Usually 
this needs to be done on the departmental level. As a 
result, political programs, especially in domains 
concerning more than one department, will often be 
maintained for quite a long time. 
Federal coordination — the interaction between the 
federal government and cantons 
After the former corporatist structure was aban-
doned, the re-established Swiss University Confer-
ence (SUC) of 2001 brought about closer interaction 
between representatives of the federal government 
and the cantons, and changed the type of collabora-
tive patterns. Government members of both federal 
levels became the principal players to assume the 
task of strategic decision-making in a more closely 
connected higher education policy between the fed-
eral government and the cantons. The main issue of 
the policy is to structure the division of labour and 
collaboration in Switzerland’s university landscape. 
Problems occurred because the SUC’s competences 
are restricted to cantonal universities. This was in 
part related to the establishment of the polytechnics 
as a new tertiary education actor — attached to a 
different governance regime (see Figure 2). 
This duplication of governance mechanisms in the 
field of higher education entailed many difficulties. 
When new curricula following the Bologna treaty 
were introduced in cantonal universities and poly-
technics, coordination needs became more and more 
obvious. In addition, the mutual dependency of the 
two higher education fields — general and voca-
tional education — has led to a process of organisa-
tional concentration in most cantonal administrations 
while authority remained dispersed at the federal 
government level. Therefore, representatives of  
cantonal governments today have to approach two 
federal departments for balanced funding or sensible 
solutions for higher education as a whole (e.g. re-
garding accreditation, quality assessment, etc.). This 
situation resulted in a major reform project that is 
still under way (see below). 
Horizontal coordination at the departmental level 
As we mentioned, a central coordination problem in 
Switzerland concerns the interaction between the 
Departments of Home Affairs and of Economic Af-
fairs. On this level we are interested in the degree to 
which the ‘dualism’ between the more economically 
oriented and science-oriented policy domains can be 
bridged. The political will to split the responsibilities 
for education, research, and innovation into two de-
partments does not mean that eventual problems of 
coordination linked to this dual structure were not 
recognised. Two institutional devices were intro-
duced to prevent such problems. 
The first attempt to bring the visions of the two 
ministries together has been the decision that hence-
forth the Message should be presented together by 
both departments. It was meant to become a strategy 
of the federal government for the whole knowledge 
policy area. To this end it was decided to establish 
ad hoc working groups in which specific topics were 
discussed between representatives of both depart-
ments. These working groups then draft the respec-
tive chapters of the Message. This preliminary 
version becomes subject to the co-signature proce-
dure, involving other federal offices and depart-
ments. This approach was also applied in order to 
negotiate the budget in the four knowledge policy 
fields. In case the committees were not able to  
resolve disputes, decisions were shifted to the two 
Federal Councillors in charge of the FDHA and the 
FDEA. They were also entitled to settle the final 
budget proposal before the entire government voted 
on it. 
There is no doubt that the introduction of the 
common Message was a first step toward more co-
herent policies in these sectors. Government officials 
were quite positive when we asked them about the 
importance of the common Message; they especially 
underlined the progress with regard to the previous 
situation, the significance of common goals, and 
comprehensive financial planning for all sector poli-
cies. In fact, one should not underestimate the im-
pact of the first governmental Message in 1998 
regarding the promotion of education, research, and 
technology, as it introduced not only a new form in 
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linked to this dual structure were not 
recognised 
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which to present these issues to the parliament but 
also a new ‘political era’. 
A new state secretary for science and research 
prepared the first common Message shortly after he 
took office. Hence, he was able to frame the devel-
opment of the respective policy fields according to 
his vision, which was to create a vast network of 
Swiss universities in which division of labour and 
competition takes place in parallel (Kleiber, 1999). 
The SUC became the central organ for the imple-
mentation of this policy. 
In this respect we have to point to another impor-
tant aspect: one should not neglect the temporal  
dimension in the Swiss context. State secretaries 
have so far held their office longer than only one 
legislative period and therefore have been able to 
influence the content of several Messages in a row. 
Of course, this allows the follow-up of initiated 
strategies for a long time, which is not possible in 
most countries facing restrictions of more short-term 
political responsibilities. 
Yet, in the often harsh political reality, the strug-
gle for resources and differences in worldviews and 
strategies between the two departments have contin-
ued to prevail and so far have undermined the emer-
gence of a common and encompassing view on 
knowledge and innovation policy (Braun et al, 
2007). The Message is, as a member of parliament 
put it, still rather a ‘bazaar of domain interests’ than 
a sound attempt to develop a coherent strategy. The 
strategies for professional education and for the 
more technologically oriented approach to foster 
innovation within the FDEA are not compatible with 
the FDHA’s focus on universities as a source of cul-
tural and societal developments, on basic science, 
and on a broad notion of innovation. 
An actual ‘whole-government perspective’ for the 
entire knowledge and innovation domain cannot be 
identified in any of the three Messages published 
since. In this, Switzerland confirms doubts that are 
brought forward in the literature about ‘sociological 
institutionalism’ (March and Olsen, 1989) and about 
‘purposive actor models’ (Peters, 1992; see also the 
introduction to this special issue of Science and Pub-
lic Policy) as well as in the studies made by the 
‘Technopolis-group’ concerning policy coordination 
capabilities in political systems (Boekholt et al, 
2002; Arnold and Boekholt, 2003) and the OECD 
(2005a,b,c). 
The second institutional device to promote hori-
zontal coordination at the departmental level was the 
creation of an inter-ministerial coordination commit-
tee between the two departments in 1998, the Steer-
ing Committee Education, Research, Innovation. 
The set-up of this committee has certainly contrib-
uted to the establishment of more regular contacts 
and an exchange of information between the two 
departments. According to senior government offi-
cials, the committee has had some effects on coordi-
nation of governmental research activities and is also 
involved in the preparation of legislation planning. 
There is no evidence, however, that these discus-
sions have led to a reconciliation of the fundamental 
political strategies (Farago, 2006). Only overt prob-
lems of efficiency (duplication of efforts, for exam-
ple) in specific research areas could be addressed in 
this way (Farago, 2006). Thus, the Steering Commit-
tee Education, Research, Technology was not able to 
establish a substantive coordination role, for  
example, in the development of higher education or 
promotion of a closer integration of research and 
technology policy. 
It is apparently very difficult to achieve a higher 
degree of coordination at the level of the departments. 
Their coordination capacity has clear limitations, 
given that the major concern of the interactions be-
tween the two ministries is the distribution of federal 
expenditures among the policy fields. 
Horizontal coordination at the intermediary level 
Can we consider the agency level as an alternative  
to coordination capacities at the department level  
in Switzerland? A shifting of coordination tasks to 
this level is used by various governments, as the 
OECD reports (2005a). In the introduction to this 
special issue of Science and Public Policy, doubts 
were raised about the feasibility of such a step. What 
can Switzerland add to our understanding in this  
respect? 
The obvious limitation of such a delegation is, of 
course, that agencies are not competent in all knowl-
edge policy sectors and that, therefore, one cannot 
expect ‘all-sector coordination’. Having this restric-
tion in mind, it seems to us that the capacity of 
agencies to link different policy sectors depends 
largely on the delegated authority of funding agen-
cies regarding policy formulation and implementa-
tion. The departments do not actually delegate 
substantive (political) tasks to the agencies (Braun et 
al, 2007). We will discuss this aspect in more detail 
in the sections concerning vertical coordination. 
As in other countries, Switzerland uses such 
agencies in research, the SNSF, and technology 
funding, the CTI. The dualism at the ministerial 
level is replicated at the level of agencies, and coor-
dination efforts have so far not been very well  
developed. At the level of the agencies, no institu-
tionalised forum for collaboration or exchange of 
information exists, as we find it at the level of the 
departments in the Steering Committee Education, 
Research, Technology. At this point, we have to 
mention that the Federal Research Act foresees an 
obligation of self-coordination within and between 
the so-called research organs (especially SNSF, sci-
entific academies, ETH-Council). The CTI, how-
ever, does not belong to the ‘research organs’ in the 
sense of the Research Act. In fact, only after an 
evaluation of the SNSF and the CTI (SSTC, 2002), 
which pointed to the lack of coordination between 
both agencies, has the need to overcome this prob-
lem been widely acknowledged. The evaluation re-
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port even raised the issue of a possible fusion of 
both agencies, but they refused such a step and the 
departments did not push in this direction. 
We currently observe repeated efforts by policy-
makers to urge both agencies to intensify their  
contacts (e.g. Message, 2008–2011). Until now, only 
one common research programme has been estab-
lished, and there is an observer of the CTI in the  
applied-oriented funding division of the SNSF. 
However, the Federal Council recently proposed 
including the legal framework of the CTI in the Fed-
eral Research Act (EVD/BBT 2007) and, thus, har-
monising the legal foundations of research and 
innovation promotion. Whether or not such efforts 
are suitable for establishing closer links and 
strengthening coordination between the two agencies 
remains to be seen. 
The weak role of ‘strategic intelligence’ 
The only strategic advisory body in the knowledge 
and innovation domain is the Swiss Science and 
Technology Council (SSTC). Like the SUC, it was 
also reorganised after 1998 to become an advisory 
body comprising only scientists and scientific R&D 
experts after it had been a more ‘corporatist’ body 
that included stakeholders, politicians, and govern-
ment officials. The principal functions of the SSTC 
are to advise the Federal Council in all questions 
concerning science, research, and, since 1998, tech-
nology policies and to elaborate proposals for  
national approaches to innovation and knowledge 
policy fields. 
Thus, its strategic position is quite prominent, at 
least de jure. The SSTC has, however, today de 
facto only minor influence on political decisions, 
although it is formally involved in policy planning 
procedures (Federal Research Act, Art. 5a, Art. 22). 
The frequently published reports by the SSTC re-
ceive some public attention, but they remain discon-
nected from the political decision-making process 
(Benninghoff and Leresche, 2003: 105–111). The 
SSTC has, in particular, no substantial influence dur-
ing the composition of the quadrennial policy and 
funding propositions of the Federal Council, even 
though it has developed comprehensive recommen-
dations concerning the principal issues of the most 
recent Message5 (SSTC, 2006). 
One reason for the weakening of the SSTC has 
very likely to do with the function of a state secre-
tary; these senior government officials have so far had 
their own ambitions in strategy development and 
wanted to take the lead in matters of higher education 
and research policy. The same holds for the OPET 
that had the ambition to develop its own political 
identity. In addition, the SUC was also supposed to 
develop a more strategic view, although its authority 
is restricted to higher education. Thus, the SSTC has 
currently strong competitors in the field of strategy 
development, most of them closer to decision-makers 
than it can ever become. 
Moreover, Switzerland lacks a tradition of estab-
lishing advisory bodies at the level of departments. 
Such bodies seem to have had a positive effect on 
strategy development in some Scandinavian countries 
(see the introduction to this special issue of Science 
and Public Policy). Most of the scientific knowledge 
that the Swiss administration needs is delivered in 
the form of mandates given to individual scientists. 
Finally, Switzerland has not institutionalised any 
foresight procedures as most other countries have, 
which can again be explained by the reluctant stance 
in development of proactive policies. A similar 
problem concerns the reflexive capacity of the ad-
ministration; the ‘learning cycle’ is not thoroughly 
set up in Switzerland’s knowledge and innovation 
policy, as even administrative actors criticise the 
absence of systems- or meta-evaluations of entire 
policy fields (Hotz-Hart et al, 2006; SBF/CEST, 
2007). 
This general lack of strategic knowledge and re-
flexive capacity in the political decision-making 
process renders the formulation of coherent policies 
— at least in the present actor configuration — very 
unlikely. The SSTC does not have an explicit institu-
tional assignment as a ‘guardian’ over the whole 
portfolio of policy instruments in higher education, 
research, and innovation, nor would another body 
assume the function of a coordinating ‘clearing-
house’. 
Vertical relationships: political planning and modes 
of governance 
The discussion of coordination mechanisms in  
Switzerland’s knowledge and innovation policy so 
far has revealed the importance of the close interac-
tion between the two departments and ‘their’ agen-
cies. We would like to present, first, general patterns  
describing vertical coordination and, second, the 
current modes that govern the vertical relationships. 
We already mentioned the procedure defining po-
litical planning set down in the Federal Research Act 
that exists beside the obligation of self-coordination 
for the ‘research organs’. The procedure concerning 
policy planning describes these vertical interactions, 
and its main direction is bottom-up. The SNSF, the 
science academies, and the ETH-Council are obliged 
to submit their ‘pluri-annual’ policy planning once 
every four years to the federal government. These 
plans include statements as to whether funding 
schemes or programmes will be maintained or new 
instruments will be introduced as well as requests 
for budgets. On the basis of these documents, sub-
mitted approximately a year before the Message is 
finalised, the FDHA formulates its research policy 
— as a part of the Message. 
We find similar patterns of bottom-up requests to 
a superior authority in the realm of higher education, 
where the conference of the university rectors sub-
mits its strategic plans regarding division of labour 
and collaboration between the universities to the 
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SUC. This ‘logic of application’ in the multi-level 
context of the traditional fields of research and 
higher education policy might be considered as one 
of the most important coordination patterns. Hence, 
vertically oriented coordination mechanisms or  
collaborative schemes are, without doubt, more 
strongly institutionalised in Switzerland than hori-
zontal coordination. 
This bottom-up ‘logic of application’ has espe-
cially shaped the relationships between the FDHA 
and its subordinates. In the domains of the FDEA, 
vertical relationships are more top-down and hierar-
chical. The OPET, established in the course of the 
last ministerial reform in 1996, needed to establish 
its own policies and domain competence, often re-
sulting in an effort for a clear demarcation of its do-
main in comparison with the related domains in the 
FDHA. The CTI was, in due consequence, bound 
into a more hierarchical governance mode, and seen 
as a ‘sub-unit’ of the OPET. The different govern-
ance modes are most striking with regard to the 
higher education sector. Here the polytechnics have 
been tightly steered by the OPET, whereas similar 
influence of the state secretariat on the universities 
would not have been acceptable. 
As mentioned, the governance mode characteris-
ing the relationship between the FDHA and the 
SNSF and ETH-Council is rather ‘at arm’s length’. 
This means that the autonomy of these intermedi-
ary agencies concerning both the choice of topics 
and instruments on the one hand and their imple-
mentation on the other hand is respected in princi-
pal. With the arrival of new public management 
strategies in Swiss administration, the governance 
of the two agencies has nevertheless become more  
performance-oriented: in both cases, a performance 
contract with the state secretariat is concluded 
(Benninghoff and Leresche, 2003; Braun and  
Leresche, 2007). In the performance contract the 
general outlines of the ‘pluri-annual’ plans are con-
cretised in clear objectives and tasks, with respec-
tive performance indications. These contracts result 
from negotiations between the agencies and the 
Department of Home Affairs; they are not unilater-
ally decreed. With regard to the SNSF, the federal 
government is more involved in policy formulation 
than it is in the case of the ETH-Council: The  
government has urged the SNSF to introduce  
targeted research and has the possibility of the final 
selection, on the basis of SNSF propositions, of 
targeted research programmes. 
In considering the different governance modes as 
well as the different visions of innovation and the 
different clientele, one understands that the agencies 
have difficulties in developing a shared understand-
ing and common initiatives in innovation policy 
among themselves. 
Recent developments and future reforms 
The analysis so far does not give rise to overt opti-
mism with regard to policy coordination capacities in 
Switzerland. However, we will point to three attempts 
to enhance coordination capacities in order to illus-
trate that Switzerland is not subject to immobilism 
concerning the coordination of the knowledge space: 
1. The debate on reorganising the responsibilities for 
knowledge and innovation policy at the depart-
mental level. 
2. The planned reform of higher education govern-
ance. 
3. The contents and possible effects of ongoing  
revision of the Federal Research Act. 
Before we turn to these recent developments, we 
should mention that, in principle, there is no disagree-
ment among political actors that the knowledge and 
innovation policy sectors are functionally interde-
pendent. However, the organisation that was chosen 
in 1996 did not correspond to this line of thought, so it 
is understandable that the pressure to change the 
status quo is still there and that it is even rising. 
Because the expectation of an encompassing 
knowledge and innovation policy has not yet been 
fulfilled, the parliament currently connects the claim 
for more coordination in education, research, and 
innovation again with organisational reforms, in par-
ticular with the desire to merge the respective federal 
responsibilities in a single department or even in a 
‘superministry’ competent only in knowledge and 
innovation policy. The concentration of the respec-
tive responsibilities in one federal department would 
avoid lengthy negotiations between departments — 
that’s at least the hope of many adherents of this 
claim (Braun et al, 2007). The major reason for this 
claim is the fact that cantonal authorities have 
merged their administrative units responsible for 
cantonal universities and polytechnics, since their 
introduction and homogenous administrative struc-
ture are perceived to favour coordination; thus, it is 
actually not an altered policy conception or a clear 
political will to establish a more interactive or sys-
tematic approach in the knowledge and innovation 
field that motivates the actors to claim this reform 
(Braun et al, 2007). In other words, reorganisations 
in the administration are often seen as the most ap-
propriate means to achieve more coherent policies. 
 
Vertically oriented coordination 
mechanisms or collaborative schemes 
are, without doubt, more strongly 
institutionalised in Switzerland than 
horizontal coordination 
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This brings us to the second point, the planned  
reform of tertiary or higher education governance. 
In fact, this reform induced even more pressure on 
the current organisation of the federal departments: 
the cantons want only one interlocutor of the fed-
eral government within the planned common deci-
sion-making body (an enlarged SUC), to overcome 
obvious failures in coordinating diverging points of 
view of the existing dual representation at the fed-
eral level.  
This pressure has sufficed again to put organisa-
tional reform high on the agenda of the federal 
government. In order to establish a single govern-
ance structure in the higher education sector, com-
bining all university types (cantonal universities, 
polytechnics, ETH-domain), a new Federal Act re-
garding promotion and coordination of all universi-
ties has recently been proposed. The new law also 
explicitly recognises the linkage between higher 
education, federal research, and innovation policies 
and demands a ‘whole-government perspective’. 
Furthermore, collaboration between a new advisory 
board, the Swiss Science and Innovation Council 
(SSIC), and the enlarged SUC is designed to be-
come somewhat stronger by a plan to invite the 
president of the SSIC to participate in the discus-
sions of the politicians (see SBF/BBT, 2006). 
These are indicators of the willingness to think in 
terms of the overall knowledge space. This univer-
sity promotion and coordination act should be put 
into effect in 2012. 
Finally, a third point is the revision of the Federal 
Research Act. The objective of this revision is to 
include the CTI as an innovation agency in the re-
search act. In doing so, the former legal basis for the 
CTI, intended to deal with economic crisis preven-
tion, will be abandoned. It is proposed that the CTI 
autonomously decide on research and dvelopment 
grants-in-aid. Hence, such decisions would no 
longer be decisions formally taken by the responsi-
ble Federal Department of Economic Affairs. Yet, it 
is foreseen that the CTI will be competent only in 
individual grants and will be able to establish some 
targeted programmes, but would still be bound to 
federal strategies. All other domains currently at-
tached to the CTI, especially the assistance of SMEs 
(fostering knowledge-driven companies, access of 
SMEs to international programmes) and knowledge 
and technology transfer programmes (consortia of 
polytechnics), would remain in the competence of 
the administration, i.e. within the OPET (BBT, 
2007).  
Regarding coordination between SNSF and CTI, 
the latter will be explicitly mandated to coordinate 
its activities with the former (the SNSF has already 
received this mandate to coordinate with the CTI 
with the approval of the current Message, 2008–
2011). These explicit mandates concern only SNSF 
and CTI; the other ‘research organs’ are still consid-
ered under the general obligation of ‘self-
coordination’ between these institutions. 
Conclusion 
How can we sum up the analysis of coordination 
capacities in Switzerland, and what are the actual 
chances of bridging the two major coordination gaps 
in Switzerland — the ‘utilitarian’ and the ‘federal 
divide’? 
We observed that a large majority of decision-
makers endorse further efforts to strengthen the bonds 
between the four core sectors of the knowledge 
space in Switzerland. 
This intention to increase the degree of interaction 
in the knowledge space obviously entails ‘cognitive’ 
and structural adaptations — first and foremost, the 
formulation of encompassing policies and, in the 
long run, possibly also a structural integration of 
currently separated policy fields — and, thus, the 
dissolution of the ‘utilitarian divide’. What measures 
and developments have we identified in this respect? 
One can interpret the reform strategy of the state 
secretary in the FDHA since 1998 as a pragmatic 
long-term vision of overcoming the fragmentation of 
one important part of the knowledge space: its focus 
was directed to higher education institutions as the 
centrepieces of the education and research sector. 
The ‘policy of structuring’ in the FDHA is meant to 
strengthen the universities, by organising their divi-
sion of labour and collaboration, and is to a certain 
extent also implemented in the realm of research 
policy (targeted research programmes of the SNSF). 
With this strategy, it was far more important to in-
fluence the level of knowledge activities in the 
higher education system than to immediately attack 
the utilitarian divide on the governance level. 
Unfortunately, Switzerland is suffering from 
rather unfavourable structures for the development 
of a more encompassing knowledge and innovation 
policy, which can be summarised as follows. First, a 
reorganisation of the federal administrative structure 
was conducted in 1996 and in the aftermath of the 
reform the ‘utilitarian divide’ was even more culti-
vated at departmental and agency levels; in addition, 
the emphasis on distributive questions at the depart-
mental level makes a more substantive policy coor-
dination rather unlikely. Second, the creation of the 
Office of Professional Education and Technology 
(OPET) and of the polytechnics undermined a co-
herent development of tertiary education, since the 
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OPET took great pains to demarcate its sphere of in-
fluence by focussing on the utilitarian side of knowl-
edge space. Third, Switzerland faces a structural 
problem in exerting political leadership at the level of 
the cabinet and a lack of strategic intelligence and 
reflexive capacities at all institutional levels. 
Nevertheless, structural reforms and adaptations 
in the orientation of knowledge and innovation poli-
cies have been conducted and are still in progress. 
The first reform of higher education governance in 
1998 (which reformed the SUC) as well as the pro-
posal of the new Federal Act on Promotion and Co-
ordination of the Universities demonstrate a 
willingness to adapt higher education institutions to 
global challenges by organisational reforms and to 
think of higher education as one ‘integrated system’ 
that needs close interaction with research and inno-
vation policies in the future. This does not yet make 
an encompassing knowledge and innovation policy 
but it expresses a willingness to think in relational 
terms and to organise linkages in the knowledge 
space. 
What this new reform of higher education govern-
ance actually aims to do is to take care of the federal 
divide. Such an objective has needed the consent of 
the cantons; therefore, most of the reform energy dur-
ing the last ten years has been invested in it. In the  
future, the new law should allow the federal govern-
ment and the cantons to steer and plan the entire 
higher education system in close collaboration, on the 
basis of common agreed-upon principles, and also to 
link higher education to research and innovation pol-
icy as well. We are sceptical, however, about the pos-
sible success of this endeavour. The cooperation 
among federal actors, as well as a still subdued role of 
strategic intelligence in the construction, might make 
it difficult to use this governance structure to effec-
tively establish more cohesion in policy-making; the 
demand to find large majorities and the veto-power of 
the federal government bear the risk of non-decisions 
or of a policy of the lowest common denominator 
(Scharpf, 1988). 
Yet, the reform of higher education governance 
has an interesting repercussion for the problem of 
the institutionalised ‘utilitarian divide’: because the 
cantons wish that only one Federal Department 
would be competent in the realm of higher educa-
tion, the separation of universities and polytechnics 
in the federal administration is strongly challenged. 
It is foreseeable that Switzerland will merge the  
responsibilities, at least for the higher education sec-
tor, in one department. If a ‘superministry’, respon-
sible for the four policy sectors in the knowledge 
space, were to be created, this could mean a true step 
towards more encompassing policies in the knowl-
edge space. However, the core problem — to over-
come ‘utilitarian divide’ thinking — remains: there 
are no political leaders who seem able and willing to 
develop an encompassing vision of the knowledge 
space and to build bridges between the non-
utilitarian and the utilitarian sectors. If this situation 
persists, any organisational fusion of the four policy 
sectors may lead only to the continuing existence of 
the ‘utilitarian divide’ on the level of subunits within 
the ‘superministry’. 
The revision of the Federal Research Act, i.e. the 
inclusion of the innovation promotion agency CTI in 
this law, seems in fact quite promising in several 
respects; first, regarding political coordination at the 
level of the intermediary agencies and, second, be-
cause the CTI gains more autonomy; third, because 
this revision will be the end of the legal separation 
between (basic) research and (technological) innova-
tion and, thus, it attaches the CTI closer to the ‘non-
utilitarian’ side of the knowledge space and, finally, 
because of the reduction of laws that claim authority 
in the knowledge space. Hence, it is most likely that 
a future adaptation of this law — it will certainly be 
necessary when the new higher education govern-
ance is implemented — would lead to a clearer and 
more coherent definition of the horizontal interac-
tions between basic research and technological in-
novation. Such a revision would be a most 
favourable opportunity to adapt the procedures for 
policy planning in research and innovation to the 
strategic planning mechanisms in the realm of higher 
education. 
In short: while Switzerland has taken measures to 
strengthen linkages at the level of knowledge activi-
ties and to enhance federal collaboration, it has been 
less successful in overcoming the ‘utilitarian divide’ 
within the federal machinery of government. Policy 
adaptations are observable in all sectors of the 
knowledge space, and even across them, but struc-
tural reforms have so far been limited to the institu-
tional realm of higher education policy. Adaptations 
of policies and structure occur in a ‘pragmatic’ and 
incremental way in Switzerland; big political visions 
or overarching political strategies are more difficult 
to establish. 
Notes 
1. Defined as the ‘core’ of national innovation systems, i.e. all 
activities directly linked to the production, diffusion, and appli-
cation of knowledge (see the introduction to this special issue 
of Science and Public Policy). 
2. For the institutionalisation and development of science policy 
in Switzerland, see Benninghoff and Leresche (2003), Fleury 
and Joye (2002), Freiburghaus et al (1991), Lepori (2007); re-
garding vocational education, the universities of applied sci-
ences, and innovation policy, see Good (2005), Hotz-Hart et al 
(2005, 2006), Pätzmann (2005). 
3. This ‘linear’ thinking also became visible when, in 1995, the 
polytechnics were created as a new actor group of higher edu-
cation institutions. The rationale for their formation was clearly 
to have organisations that could translate fundamental knowl-
edge into application — something that was missing in the  
research landscape of Switzerland. The image was the ‘value 
chain (of innovation)’ in a linear but not interactive way. 
4. Federal departments in Switzerland are quite large and het-
erogeneous in composition, as the seven seats in government 
correspond to the number of departments that are available. In 
order to cope with the limited number of departments, their 
size, and functional fragmentation, Switzerland uses so-called 
Federal offices (Bundesämter). These are functionally organ-
ised subunits responsible for one domain or a small number of 
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related policy fields within a department. It is possible to com-
bine several offices into one group (Gruppe) and to introduce 
the position of a State secretary (as a kind of junior minister) 
subordinate to the responsible minister of the department. This 
happens especially if a State secretary has to represent a 
large administrative domain in international negotiations. 
5. In the Message for the period 2008–2011, not even an entire 
page is devoted to a very succinct summary of these  
recommendations (Message, 2008–2011: 1254). Moreover we 
find no explicit linkage in this Message between the recom-
mendations of the SSTC and actual policy objectives – the 
SSTC evidently lacks the authority to make itself heard more 
prominently among representatives in government and  
parliament. 
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